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Abstract: 
In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to 
address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it  means for 
physical  constants  or  initial  conditions  to  be  fine-tuned.  We review important 
distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the 
classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two 
great  analogies,  computational  and  biological,  can  give  new insights  into  our 
problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two analogies. 
Importantly, analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can 
also be misused or misinterpreted.  The idea that our universe might be modelled 
as  a  computational  entity is  analysed,  and  we discuss  the  distinction  between 
physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin 
introduced  the  theory  of  "Cosmological  Natural  Selection"  with  a  biological 
analogy in mind. We examine an extension of this analogy involving intelligent 
life.  We discuss if and how this extension could be legitimated. 
Keywords:  origin  of  the  universe,  fine-tuning,  physical  constants,  initial 
conditions,  computational  universe,  biological  universe,  role  of  intelligent  life, 
cosmological  natural  selection,  cosmological  artificial  selection,  artificial 
cosmogenesis.
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0 Introduction1
After  Leibniz  famously  wrote  "why  is  there  something  rather  than 
nothing?" he then qualified this by writing: "Also, given that things have to exist, 
we must be able to give a reason why they have to exist  as they are and not 
otherwise."  (Leibniz  1714,  para.  7).  Trying  nowadays  to  tackle  this  age  old 
metaphysical question, we have to take into account the progress that science has 
made.  Both the emerging sciences of complexity and cosmology can help this 
philosophical  enterprise.  Modern  science  can  successfully  connect  the  general 
physico-chemical cosmological evolution with biological and cultural evolution 
(e.g. Chaisson 2001; De Duve 1995). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
science is an effective method in enabling us to understand the whole evolution of 
our  universe.  The  problem of  harmony in  the  cosmos  has  thus  shifted  to  its 
beginning : why did the universe start with these initial conditions and laws, and 
not others? 
The belief in God allowed western thinkers to understand why the "Laws 
of  Nature"  are  as  they  are  and  not  otherwise.  Scientific  activity  ultimately 
consisted of discovering the “Laws of Nature” set up by God. However, now that 
many scientists no longer believe in God, there is a lack of explanation in the 
origin of the “Laws of Nature” (Davies 1998).
Why is our universe as it  is,  and not different? This question is a very 
much debated issue, at the intersection of cosmology, theology and philosophy. In 
modern terms, it is known as the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. It states that if  
a number of parameters, both constants in physics and initial parameters in big-
bang models had been slightly different, no life or, more generally, no complexity  
would have emerged (Barrow and Tipler 1986; Davies 1982; 2008; Ellis 1993; 
Leslie 1989; 1998; Rees 2000; Hogan 2000; Barrow et al. 2008). The standard 
models  of  particle  physics  and  cosmology  require  31  free  parameters  to  be 
specified (Tegmark et al. 2006). It is a main challenge of modern physics to build 
stronger theories able to reduce this number. 
As Leslie (1989) reminds us, the argument that the universe is fine tuned is 
not  based on the  assumption  that  there  is  a  fine-tuner.  It  only means  that  the 
emergence of life or complexity is sensitive to many different slight changes in 
our physical and cosmological models. 
The literature around this issue can be divided into two main classes of 
solutions: “God” or “Multiverse”. Either it is God who created the Universe with 
all its parameters fit for life and intelligence; or there is a huge number of other 
universes with different parameters,  so that it is very probable that there is one 
containing life and intelligence. The fact that it is the one we happen to inhabit is 
an observational selection effect  which thus makes fine-tuning less mysterious 
1 This paper was commented and criticized by Greben (2009) and Vaas (2009). My response can 
be found in (Vidal 2009) where this paper also appeared.
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(e.g. Carr 2007; Bostrom 2002). 
From a rational and scientific point of view, an appeal to God suffers from 
being a non-naturalistic explanation. Furthermore, God is often linked with the 
“God of the gaps” assumption. If we can not understand a phenomenon, we use 
God to explain it, and we thus do not seek another explanation. This attitude can, 
by  its  very  definition,  explain  everything.  A parallel  can  be  made  with  the 
seemingly  opposite  approach  to  the  fine-tuning  problem,  holding  that  the 
universe's parameters happened by pure random chance.  Indeed,  this appeal to 
chance works everywhere and is not restricted by any limit; so it can also explain 
everything. One should also note that  in fine,  appealing to a multiverse with a 
selection effect is similar to the chance explanation. Indeed, in both cases we have 
the chance to be in a life-permitting universe. 
Iris Fry (1995) already pointed out in the context of explaining the origin 
of  life  that  appealing to  chance or  to  God are  after  all  similar  attempts.  This 
situation is comparable with the “God” or “Multiverse” alternative. Both options 
thus surprisingly suffer from similar shortcomings. Are there other possible roads 
to address the fine-tuning problem?
This paper aims explicitly and carefully to use two great analogies, to open 
new research axes.  These are  computational and  biological analogies. We first 
clarify what physical constants and initial conditions are, to better grasp what it 
means  to  state  that  they are  fine-tuned.  We thus  review some propositions  to 
classify  the  two  principal  sets  of  physical  parameters:  physical  constants  in 
particle  physics  and initial  conditions  in  cosmology.  Before  exploring  the two 
analogies, we investigate the basic functioning of analogical reasoning. We do this 
to avoid naïve ontological statements such as “the Universe is a computer” or “the 
Universe  is  alive”.  We  then  analyse  aspects  of  computational  and  biological 
analogies.  Among others,  this leads us to questionning the distinction between 
laws and initial conditions. We also point out some of the epistemological limits 
of Smolin's attempt to tackle the fine-tuning problem with his biological-inspired 
theory of  “Cosmological  Natural  Selection”.  We then  propose  a  philosophical 
extension to it, “Cosmological Artificial Selection” which includes a possible role 
for intelligent life. 
1 Physical constants and initial conditions
We distinguish between dimensional and dimensionless physical constants, 
as proposed by Michael Duff in (Duff, Okun, and Veneziano 2002). If a constant 
has a unit after its value, it is dimensional. Dimensional constants depend on our 
unit system choice and thus have a conventional aspect. The velocity of light  c, 
the reduced Planck constant  ħ  or  the gravitational  constant  G  are dimensional 
constants (their respective dimensions are, for example, m.s-1, eV.s and m3.kg-1.s-2). 
Certainly,  we can for example make the velocity of light equal to 1, and thus 
apparently dimensionless. However, this applies only to a particular unit system, 
and the constant will be dimensional again in another unit system. 
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By contrast, dimensionless constants are dimensionless in any unit system. 
They are ratios between two physical quantities, such as two forces or two masses. 
For example, the electron-proton mass ratio is me/mp = 1/1836.15... Since the two 
quantities are masses, we can get rid of the units (i.e. the dimension), and keep 
only  a  pure  number.  Other  dimensionless  constants  are  deduced  by a  similar 
dimensional analysis. If the analysis leads to a pure number without dimension, 
we have a “dimensionless” constant.
Along with this dimensional versus dimensionless distinction, Jean-Marc 
Lévy-Leblond  (1979,  238) proposed  another  complementary  classification  of 
physical  constants.  Three  types  are  distinguished,  in  order  of  increasing 
generality: 
A. Properties of particular physical objects considered as fundamental constituents 
of  matter;  for  instance,  the  masses  of  "elementary  particles",  their  magnetic 
moments, etc.
B. Characteristics of classes of physical phenomena: Today, these are essentially the 
coupling  constants  of  the  various  fundamental  interactions  (nuclear,  strong  and 
weak, electromagnetic and gravitational), which to our present knowledge, provide a 
neat partition of all physical phenomena into disjoint classes. 
C.  Universal  constants,  that  is  constants  entering  universal  physical  laws, 
characterizing  the  most  theoretical  frameworks,  applicable  in  principle  to  any 
physical phenomenon; Planck constant ħ is a typical example. 
The classification is only intended to be a basis for discussing and analysing the 
historical evolution of different physical constants. For example, the constant  c, 
the velocity of light, was first discovered as a type-A constant. It was a property of 
light, as a physical object. With the work of Kirchhoff, Weber, Kohlrausch and 
Maxwell, the constant gained type-B status when it was discovered that it also 
characterized electromagnetic phenomena. Finally, it gained type-C status when 
special  and  general  relativity  were  discovered,  synthesizing  concepts  such  as 
spatio-temporal  intervals,  or  mass  and  energy  (see  (Lévy-Leblond  1979, 
252-258) for a detailed account of  the status change of c). 
What happens next, when a constant has reached its type-C status? The 
fate of universal constants (type-C), explains Lévy-Leblond, is to "see their nature 
as concept synthesizers be progressively incorporated into the implicit common 
background of physical ideas, then to play a role of mere unit conversion factors 
and often to be finally forgotten altogether by a suitable redefinition of physical 
units."  (Lévy-Leblond 1979, 246). More precisely, this remark leads him to the 
distinction of three subclasses of type-C constants, according to their historical 
status:  
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(i) the modern ones, whose conceptual role is still dominant (e.g. ħ, c); 
(ii)  the  classical ones,  whose conceptual role is  implicit  and which are 
considered as unit conversion factors (e.g. thermodynamical constants  k, 
J); 
(iii)  archaic ones, which are so well  assimilated as to become invisible 
(e.g. the now obvious ideas that areas are square of lengths). 
If  all  dimensional  constants  follow  this  path,  then  they  all  become 
“archaic”, and thus integrated in the background of physical theories. The fate of 
dimensional constants seems then to fade away. Is it possible to seriously consider 
this remark, and try to relegate all dimensional constants to archaic ones? Michael 
Duff  (Duff  2002;  Duff,  Okun,  and  Veneziano  2002) did  a  first  step  in  this 
direction by convincingly arguing that the number of dimensional constants (type-
C) can be reduced to ... zero! Thus, he considers constants like c, G, ħ, which are 
often considered as “fundamental”,  as merely unit conversion factors. According 
to his terminology, only dimensionless constants should be seen as fundamental. 
A dimensionless physics approach is also proposed in the framework of 
scale  relativity  (Nottale  2003,  16).  Following  the  idea  of  relativity,  one  can 
express any physical expression in terms of ratios. Indeed, in the last analysis a 
physical  quantity  is  always  expressed  relative to  another. Of  course, 
experimentalists  still  need to refer to metric systems, and often to many more 
dimensional physical constants than just the common c, G and ħ. The point here is 
that it is possible to express the results in physical equations without reference to 
those dimensional constants (see also  (Lévy-Leblond 1979, 248-251)). 
What are the consequences of these insights for fine-tuning arguments? If 
the fate of dimensional constants is to disappear, then the associated fine-tuning 
arguments with these constants should also disappear. Considering what would 
happen if a type-C dimensional constant would be different has to be considered 
skeptically. Such a scenario has already been considered, for example by Rozental 
(1980) where he analysed what would happen if the Planck constant were to be 
increased  by  15%.  Again,  as  Duff  argued,  the  problem  is  that  dimensional 
constants  are  conventions,  and  changing  them  is  changing  a  convention,  not 
physics. It is thus only meaningful to express the possible changes in terms of 
dimensionless constants. 
In  fact,  most  fine-tuning  arguments  focus  on  considering  changes  in 
dimensionless constants. Typically, they consider what would happen if we were 
to change one of the four fundamental dimensionless coupling constants. These 
include α for electromagnetism,  αG for gravity,  αW  for the weak nuclear force and 
αs  for the strong nuclear force. It should be noted that these constants are actually 
not constant, since they change with energy scale (Wilczek 1999). 
The main conclusion in this area of study is that there are  conditions  on 
these constants for key events in the evolution of complexity in the universe to 
occur. For example, during the big-bang nucleosynthesis, the condition αG < (αW)4 
must  be  fulfilled,  or  else  all  hydrogen  goes  to  helium.  Bernard  Carr 
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(2007a) provided  a  detailed  account  of  other  constraints  related  to  these  four 
constants  for  the  baryosynthesis,  nucleosynthesis,  star  formation  and  planet 
formation to occur. 
Along with these coupling constants, there is a whole other set of fine-
tuning arguments based on cosmological parameters.  These include parameters 
such as matter density (Ω), amplitude of initial density fluctuations, photon-to-
baryon ratio, etc. For example, the “total density parameter Ω must lie within an 
order of magnitude of unity. If it were much larger than unity, the Universe would 
recollapse on a time-scale much less than the main-sequence time of a star. On the 
other hand, if it were much smaller than unity, density fluctuations would stop 
growing before galaxies could bind.”  (Carr 2007, 80). We wrote in introduction 
that one of the main challenges of modern physics is to construct theories able to 
reduce this number of parameters, both in the standard model of particle physics 
and in cosmological models. Parameters involved in cosmological models can be 
explained  by  new  physical  theories.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  dimensionless 
cosmological constant, whose value has been predicted by scale relativity (Nottale 
2008, 27-31). 
Following  Duff  and  Lévy-Leblond,  we  saw  that  type-C  constants  are 
bound to disappear. Another challenge we would like to propose is the following: 
could  type-A  and  type-B  constants  emerge  from  initial  conditions  in  a 
cosmological model? If we were be able to explain all these constants in terms of 
a cosmological model, it would certainly be a great achievement. Smolin (1997, 
316) also argued that fundamentally, progress in quantum mechanics must lead to 
a cosmological theory. Indeed, all particles ultimately originate from the big-bang, 
thus a complete understanding of particle physics should include an explanation  
of their origin, and thus relate with a cosmological model.  
In a certain sense, progress in this direction has already happened, if we 
consider the discovery of big-bang nucleosynthesis. Properties of atomic elements 
could be thought as fundamental constituents of matter, and thus type-A constants, 
until  we  discovered  they  were  actually  formed  at  the  big-bang  era.  If  we 
extrapolate this trend, a future cosmological model may be able to derive many 
(or even all) type-A constants from initial conditions. 
The  same  can  be  said  about  fundamental  coupling  constants  (type-B). 
Special scale relativity can indeed predict the value of αs  (the strong nuclear force) 
at the Z mass energy level. This was predicted with great precision, and has been 
confirmed by experimental measures (see (Nottale 2008, 26-27) in this volume for 
further details). Thus, if physics continues its progress, it is reasonable to conceive 
that particle physics models would become integrated into a cosmological model. 
The  consequence  for  fine-tuning  arguments  is  that   fine-tuning  of  physical  
constants would progressively be reduced to initial conditions of a cosmological  
model.  
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Given this analysis of physical constants, let us now examine an argument 
against the idea of fine-tuning proposed by Chaisson (2006, xvi-xvii):
Rather than appealing to Providence or "multiverses" to justify the numerical values 
of some physical constants (such as the speed of light or the charge of an electron), I 
prefer to reason that when the laws of science become sufficiently robust, we shall 
naturally  understand  the  apparent  "fine-tuning"  of  Nature.  It's  much  akin  to 
mathematics, when considering the value of π. Who would have thought, a priori, 
that the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter would have the odd value of 
3,14159.... ? Why isn't it just 3, or 3,1, or some other crisp number, rather than such 
a peculiar value that runs on ad infinitum? We now understand enough mathematics 
to realize that this is simply the way geometry scales; there is nothing mystical about 
a perfect circle -yet it surely is fine-tuned, and if it were not it wouldn't be a circle. 
Circles exist as gracefully rounded curves closed upon themselves  because π  has 
the odd value it  does. Likewise,  ordered systems in Nature, including life,  likely 
exist because the physical constants have their decidedly odd values. 
First, we can remark that the speed of light and the charge of the electron 
are  dimensional constants.  As we analysed,  it  makes not  much sense to speak 
about a variation, and thus a fine-tuning of them (see also (Duff 2002)). 
Let  us  look more  closely at  Chaisson's  suggestion  that  if  “the  laws of 
science  become sufficiently  robust  we shall  naturally  understand  the  apparent 
'fine-tuning' of Nature”. Considering what we have argued so far, we can agree 
with this.  We have outlined Duff's  proposal that  dimensional  constants  can be 
reduced to 0. We have suggested that fundamental coupling constants could be in 
future  explained  from  more  general  principles,  and  that  many  apparent 
“fundamental constants” in the past can nowadays be explained by more general 
theories. Accordingly, a great deal of fine-tuning has been and certainly will be 
explained by more advanced physical theories. 
Let us now examine the analogy with π. We can see a disanalogy between 
mathematical and physical constants. Mathematical constants are defined a priori 
by the axioms: they are  internal to the system and are generally definable and 
computable numbers. For example, we have plenty of algorithms to calculate π. 
This is not the case with physical constants. Many of them remain external to the  
system, in the sense that they are not computable from inside the model. At some 
stage  there  has  been  a  measurement  process  to  get  their  values.  We  can 
reformulate Chaisson's position by saying that progress in science will allow us to 
understand (or compute) these constants, from more fundamental principles. We 
will develop this computational view in the third section of this paper. 
However,  if  we  saw  that  future  physics  could  understand  physical 
constants in terms of a cosmological model,  it  is unlikely that this would also 
include the initial conditions of this model. Indeed, if we were to have a theory 
deciding all values of initial conditions in a cosmological model, it then leads to 
the idea of a “final theory” or a “theory of everything”. This would bring many 
conceptual and metaphysical problems (Rescher 2000). One of these problems is 
that, ironically, this idea of a final theory is an act of faith and is thus similar to the 
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Providence explanation  (e.g. Davies 2008, 170). Smolin (1997, 248) wrote that 
the “belief in a final theory shares with a belief in a god the idea that the ultimate 
cause of things in this world is something that does not live in the world but has 
an existence that, somehow, transcends it.” Fine-tuning arguments based on initial 
conditions of a cosmological model thus remain intact in Chaisson's critique. 
2 Analogies for scientific purposes
We have seen some aspects of physical parameters from a physical point 
of view. We will shortly turn to other approaches to the fine-tuning issue, inspired 
by computational and biological analogies. However,  let  us begin with a short 
digression explaining how analogies can be used for scientific purposes.  Many 
great scientific discoveries have been triggered by analogies (see  (Holyoak and 
Thagard 1995, chap.  8) for plenty of examples).  This constitutes an important 
motivation to understand in greater detail the functioning of analogical reasoning. 
Analogical reasoning is certainly an essential cognitive tool, which nevertheless 
needs to be carefully used. 
What is an analogy? It is a structural or functional similarity between two 
domains of knowledge. For example, a cloud and a sponge are analogous in the 
sense that they can both hold and give back water. More precisely, we can give the 
following definition: “an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain 
(the  base)  into  another  (the  target)  such  that  a  system of  relations  that  holds 
among  the  base  objects  also  holds  among  the  target  objects.”  (Gentner  and 
Jeziorski 1993, 448-449). In this very simple example, the relations “holding and 
giving back water” which are verified in the base (the cloud) are also verified in 
the target (the sponge). 
Analogical  reasoning  is  recognized  to  be  a  basic  cognitive  mechanism 
allowing us  to  learn  and solve problems  (e.g.  Minsky 1986;  Hofstadter  1995; 
Holyoak and Thagard 1995). Leary (1990, 2) even argued that language and every 
kind  of  knowledge  is  rooted  in  metaphorical  or  analogical  thought  processes. 
Indeed,  when  we  do  not  know a  domain  at  all,  we  must  use  analogies  as  a 
cognitive tool to potentially gain some insights from what we already know. In 
this manner, a map from the known to the unknown can be drawn. 
Specifically, Holyoak and Thagard (1995, 185-189) argued that analogical 
reasoning is helpful in discovering, developing, educating, or evaluating scientific 
theories. Indeed, they allow us to propose new hypotheses, and thus discover new 
phenomena. These new hypotheses trigger us to  develop new experiments and 
theories.  Let  us  note  however  that  there  is  nothing  automatic  or  easy  in  this 
process. The relational system should first be examined in both domains, and then 
a more precise analogy or disanalogy can be found worthy of testing. 
The  educating part  of  analogies  is  useful  for  diffusing  scientific 
knowledge,  both  to  colleagues  and pupils.  Indeed,  it  can  be  very helpful  and 
efficient to consciously use analogies to help others grasp a new idea, based on 
what they already know. 
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The  evaluating  part  confronts  us  with  one  of  the  main  dangers  of 
analogies. One should emphasize that  an analogy is not a proof. Analogies can 
thus not properly be used to prove statements, but their main utility is in giving 
heuristics for  discovering  and  developing  scientific  theories.  To  illustrate  this 
point, let us consider the teleological argument of God's existence popularized by 
William Paley (1802), based on the analogy of our Universe with a watch. It goes 
as follows:
(1) A watch is a fine-tuned object.
(2) A watch has been designed by a watchmaker.
(3) The Universe is fine-tuned.
(4) The Universe has been designed by God.
In the base domain (1-2), we have two objects, the watch and the watchmaker. 
They are linked by a “designed by” relationship. In the target domain (3-4), the 
Universe is like a watch, and God, like a watchmaker. That the relation (1)-(2) is a 
verifiable fact does not imply at all that the same  relation  “designed by” in (3)-
(4) should be true. There is no causal relationship between the couple (1)-(2) and 
(3)-(4).  This reasoning at most gives us an heuristic invitation to ponder whether 
the universe is fine-tuned.  Although it is a logically flawed argument, one can 
appreciate that this reasoning induces a strong intuitive appeal. 
There are in fact  other pitfalls  associated with analogical reasoning.  To 
avoid  them,  Gentner  and  Jeziorski  (1993,  450) proposed  six  principles  of 
analogical reasoning (Gentner 1993, 450):
1. Structural consistency. Objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence and 
parallel connectivity in predicates is maintained.
2. Relational focus. Relational systems are preserved and object descriptions 
disregarded.
3. Systematicity. Among various relational interpretations, the one with the greatest 
depth - that is, the greatest degree of common higher-order relational structure - is 
preferred. 
4. No extraneous associations. Only commonalities strengthen an analogy. Further 
relations and associations between the base and target - for example, thematic 
connections - do not contribute to the analogy. 
5. No mixed analogies. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely 
contained within one base domain. When two bases are used, they should each 
convey a coherent system.
6. Analogy is not causation. That two phenomena are analogous does not imply that 
one causes the other. 
Is it possible to further generalize the use of analogical reasoning into a 
science which would focus only on the structural or functional aspects of systems? 
Studying different models in different disciplines having structural or functional 
similarities leads to the development of very general interdisciplinary scientific 
frameworks, like the network or systems theory paradigms. Indeed, Ludwig van 
Bertalanffy  defined  general  systems  theory  as  an  interdisciplinary  doctrine 
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“elaborating principles and models that apply to systems in general, irrespective 
of their particular kind, elements, and 'forces' involved” (Bertalanffy, quoted in 
(Laszlo 1972, xvii)). In a similar fashion, the study of networks is independent of 
the nodes and types of relations considered. 
To  conclude  this  section,  one  can  use  Hesse's  (1966,  8) pragmatically 
valuable distinction between positive, negative and neutral analogies. The positive 
analogy addresses  the question:  what  is  analogous?  and constitutes  the set  of 
relations  which  hold  in  the  two domains.  The  negative  analogy addresses  the 
question: what is disanalogous? and constitutes the set of relations which do not 
hold in the two domains. Finally, neutral analogies trigger the question:  are the 
two domains analogous? To answer this last question, one has to examine or test 
if such or such relation holds in the target domain.
Given this analysis, we can now carefully explore the fine-tuning issue, 
aided by computational and biological analogies. Since we have claimed in the 
first  section  that  fine-tuning  arguments  could  be  in  future  reduced  to  initial 
conditions, we will now focus on this aspect. 
3 The computational universe
The idea that our universe is analogous to a computer is a popular one. We 
can  see  it  as  the  modern  version  of  a  mechanistic  worldview,  looking  at  the 
universe as a machine.  There are various ways to consider this  analogy,  with 
cellular  automata,  e.g.  (Wolfram  2002) with  quantum  computing  e.g.  (Lloyd 
2005), etc. The analogy has been pushed so far that a modern version of idealism 
has even be considered, i.e. that our universe would actually be run by a computer, 
and  we might  be  living  in  a  computer  simulation  (e.g.  Bostrom 2003;  Martin 
2006). 
We saw that fine-tuning arguments might ultimately be reduced to initial 
conditions of a cosmological model. Here, we examine what the initial conditions 
are from a computational perspective, and discuss the relation between laws and 
initial  conditions.  This  is  conducted  within  the  framework  of  Algorithmic 
Information  Theory  (AIT,  (Chaitin  1974;  1987)).  We  will  then  argue  that 
computer simulations provide an indispensable tool if we wish to tackle the fine-
tuning problem scientifically. We will conclude by pointing out some limitations 
of this computational analogy.  
AIT studies complexity measures on strings. The complexity measure -the 
Kolmogorov complexity2- of an object such as a piece of text is a measure of the 
computational resources needed to specify the object. Below is a simple example 
originally  presented  in  the  Wikipedia  encyclopaedia  (2008) :
2 also  known  as  program-size  complexity,  Kolmogorov-complexity,  descriptive  complexity, 
stochastic complexity, or algorithmic entropy.
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consider the following two strings of length 64, each containing only lower-case 
letters, numbers, and spaces:
abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab
4c1j5b2p0cv4w1 8rx2y39umgw5q85s7ur qbjfdppa0q7nieieqe9noc4cvafzf 
The first string admits a short English language description, namely "ab 32 times", 
which consists of 11 characters. The second one has no obvious simple description 
(using the same character set) other than writing down the string itself, which has 64 
characters.
In this AIT framework, laws represent information which can be greatly shortened 
by  algorithmic  compression  (like  the  “ab  32  times”  string);  whereas  initial 
conditions represent information which cannot be so compressed (like the second 
string). If we import this analogy into physics, a physical law is to be likened to a 
simple program able  to  give a  compressed description of  some aspects  of the 
world; whereas initial conditions are data that we do not know how to compress. 
Can  we  interpret  this  distinction  between  physical  laws  and  initial 
conditions in a cognitive manner? We either express our knowledge in terms of 
laws if  we can compress  information,  and in  terms of initial  conditions if  we 
cannot. In this view, scientific progress allows us to dissolve initial conditions into 
new theories, by using more general and efficient algorithmic compression rules. 
In mathematics, Gödel's limitation theorems state that in any sufficiently 
rich logical system, there will remain undecidable propositions in that system. But 
using  another  stronger  system,  one  can  decide  such  previously  "undecidable" 
propositions  (even  if  new  undecidable  propositions  will  arise  in  the  stronger 
system...). For example, the consistency of Peano's arithmetic cannot be shown to 
be  consistent  within  arithmetic,  but  can  be  shown to  be  consistent  relative to 
modern set theory (ZFC). 
There is a theorem similar to Gödel's incompleteness in AIT. Informally, it 
states that a computational system cannot compress structure in a system that is 
more  algorithmically  complex  than  this  computational  system.  Let  us  assume 
again that physical laws represent compressible information, and initial conditions 
incompressible  information.  Are  initial  conditions  in  cosmological  models 
algorithmically incompressible? There are two ways to answer this question. 
First, we can interpret this incompressible data in an absolute way. This 
data is then “lawless, unstructured, patternless, not amenable to scientific study, 
incompressible”  (Chaitin 2006, 64). Suggesting that those initial conditions are 
incompressible  implicitly implies  that  we,  poor humans,  will  never  be able  to 
understand them. This attitude freezes  scientific  endeavour  and thus  has  to  be 
rejected. Limitation theorems are only valid within formal systems, because one 
needs the system to be completely formalized and specific formal tools to be able 
to  prove  them.  Therefore,  we  should  be  extremely  careful  when  exporting 
limitation theorems into other less formalized domains. Moreover, the history of 
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science has shown that it is hazardous to fix boundaries on human understanding. 
Let us take the example of infinity, which was for many centuries thought to be 
understandable  only  by  a  God  who  is  infinite,  and  not  by  finite  humans.  A 
rigorous  theory  of  infinite  numbers,  constituting  the  foundations  of  modern 
mathematics,  has  finally  been  proposed  by  the  mathematician  Georg  Cantor. 
Therefore,  boundaries  are  likely  to  be  broken.  We  will  shortly  see  how  the 
multiverse  hypothesis or  computer universe simulation bring  us  beyond  the 
apparently incompressible initial conditions. 
The second option is that incompressible information may reflect the limits 
of our theoretical models. If we are not able to account for the reasons of initial 
conditions, it is a hint that we need a broader theoretical framework to understand 
them. This situation can be illustrated by considering the problem of the origin of 
life. In this context, initial conditions for life to emerge are generally assumed 
without justification: chemical elements are assumed to be here, along with an 
Earth  with  water,  neither  too  far  nor  too  near  from the  Sun,  etc.  With  these 
hypotheses (and others), we try to explain the origin of life. Now, what if we try to 
explain the origin of these initial suitable conditions for life? We would then need 
a broader theory, which in this case is a theory of cosmic evolution. If we then aim 
to explain initial conditions in cosmology, we are back to the problem of fine-
tuning. 
As  we  wrote  in  the  introduction,  multiverse  models  are  precisely 
attempting to introduce a broader theory to explain those initial  conditions, by 
proposing the existence of various other possible universes with different initial 
conditions.  The  problem  is  that  the  multiverse  hypothesis  is  a  metaphysical  
assumption. George Ellis (2007a, 400) expressed it well:
There  can  be  no  direct  evidence  for  the  existence  of  other  universes  in  a  true 
multiverse,  as  there is  no possibility of  even an indirect  causal  connection.  The 
universes are completely disjoint and nothing that happens in one can affect what 
happens  in  another.  Since  there  can  be  no  direct  or  indirect  evidence  for  such 
systems,  what  weight  does  the  claim  for  their  existence  carry?  
Experimental  or  observational  testing  requires  some  kind  of  causal  connection 
between an object and an experimental apparatus, so that some characteristic of the 
object  affects  the  output  of  the  apparatus.  But  in  a  true  multiverse,  this  is  not 
possible. No scientific apparatus in one universe can be affected in any way by any 
object in another universe. The implication is that the supposed existence of true 
multiverses can only be a metaphysical assumption. It cannot be a part of science, 
because science involves experimental or observational tests to enable correction of 
wrong theories. However, no such tests are possible here because there is no relevant 
causal link.
To improve testability, Ellis further suggests examining a variation on the causally 
disconnected universes, considering multi-domain universes that are not causally 
disconnected. Still, I would like to emphasize the philosophical importance of the 
multiverse hypothesis, because it is a logically consistent way to tackle the fine-
tuning problem. Is there a way other than the multiverse to theorize about “other 
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possible universes”? This is what we will analyse now.  
One  of  the  main  limitations  of  fine-tuning  arguments  is  that  the  vast 
majority of them vary one single parameter of physical or cosmological models 
and conclude that the resulting universe is not fit for developing complexity. What 
if  we would change  several parameters at  the same time? For example,  if  the 
expansion rate of the universe had been greater, and gravity had been stronger, 
could  the  two  changes  cancel  each  other  out?  Systematically  exploring  those 
possibilities seems like a very cumbersome enterprise. As Gribbin and Rees wrote 
(1991, 269): 
If we modify the value of one of the fundamental constants, something invariably 
goes wrong, leading to a universe that is inhospitable to life as we know it. When we 
adjust a second constant in an attempt to fix the problem(s), the result, generally, is 
to create three new problems for every one that we "solve". The conditions in our 
universe really do seem to be uniquely suitable for life forms like ourselves, and 
perhaps even for any form of organic complexity. 
A way to overcome this problem would be to use  computer simulations  to test 
systematical  modifications  of  constants'  values.  An  early  attempt  of  such  an 
approach has been proposed by Victor Stenger (1995; 2000). He has performed a 
remarkable  simulation  of  possible  universes.  He  considers  four  fundamental 
constants, the strength of electromagnetism α; the strong nuclear force αs, and the 
masses of the electron and the proton. He then analysed “100 universes in which 
the values of  the four parameters were generated randomly from a range five 
orders of magnitude above to five orders of magnitude below their values in our 
universe, that is, over a total range of ten orders of magnitude”  (Stenger 2000). 
The distribution of stellar lifetimes in those universes shows that most universes 
have stars that  live long enough to allow stellar evolution and heavy elements 
nucleosynthesis.  Anthony  Aguirre  (2001) reached  a  similar  conclusion  by 
proposing “a class of cosmologies (based on the classical ‘cold big-bang’ model) 
in which some or all of the cosmological parameters differ by orders of magnitude 
from the values they assume in the standard hot big-bang cosmology,  without 
precluding in any obvious way the existence of intelligent life.” Alejandro Jenkins 
and Gilad Perez also recently argued that different universes might be habitable 
(Jenkins and Perez 2010).  In conclusion,  other possible universes may also be 
fine-tuned!
It  is  certainly  possible  to  critique  Stenger's  simulation  as  being  too 
simplistic. Maybe we should consider other or more “fundamental” constants to 
vary; or to vary the laws of physics themselves. Stenger did not attempt to vary 
physical laws and it seems indeed a very difficult enterprise, because we do not 
even know how to make them vary (see Vaas 1998).
In fact,  the distinction between laws and boundary conditions is fuzzy in  
cosmology  (Ellis 2007b, sec. 7.1). One can see boundary conditions as imposing 
constraints, not only on initial conditions (lower boundary of the domain), but also 
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at the extremes of the domain. Both physical laws and boundary conditions play 
the same role of imposing constraints on the system at hand. Because we can not 
re-run the tape of the universe, it is difficult -if not impossible- to distinguish the 
two. In this view, some laws of physics might be interpreted as regularities of 
interactions progressively emerging out of a more chaotic state. The cooling down 
of the universe would progressively give rise to more stable dynamical systems, 
which can be described by simple mathematical equations. 
A  similar  situation  occurs  in  computer  science.  One  can  distinguish 
between a program, which is  a set  of  instructions,  and the data  on which the 
program operates.  The program is analogous to physical  laws,  and the data to 
initial  conditions.  This  distinction  in  computer  science  can  be  blurred,  when 
considering self-modifying programs, i.e. a program which modifies itself. Also, 
at a lower level, both the program and the data are processed in the form of bits, 
and here also the distinction is blurred. 
  Back to Stenger's simulation, it does not answer the following questions: 
would  other  interesting  complex  structures  like  planetary  systems,  life, 
intelligence, etc. evolve in those other universes? However, this is only an early 
attempt  in  simulating  other  possible  universes,  and  the  enterprise  is  certainly 
worth pursuing. The fine-tuning problem could then be seriously tackled, because 
we  would  know  precisely  the  likelihood  of  having  our  universe  as  it  is,  by 
comparing it to other possible universes. To summarize, this approach needs to:
(1) define a space of possible universes
(2) vary parameters defining this  space,  to see how likely it  is  to obtain a 
universe fine-tuned to develop complex structures. 
Many multiverse scenarios such as those in (Carr 2007) proposed answers to step 
(1). The second proposed step can be tackled with computer simulations. 
I argued in (Vidal 2008) that a simulation of an entire universe will result 
from future scientific  activity.  Such a  simulation  would  enable  us  not  only to 
understand our own universe (with “real-world modelling”, or processes-as-we-
know-them) but also other  possible universes (with “artificial-world modelling”, 
or  processes-as-they-could-be).  In  this  way,  we would be able  to  scientifically 
assess to what degree our universe is fine-tuned or not. If it turns out that our 
universe is not so special, then a response to fine-tuning would be a principle of 
fecundity:  “there  is  no  fine-tuning,  because  intelligent  life  of  some form will 
emerge under extremely varied circumstances” (Tegmark et al. 2006, 4).
We thus need to develop methods, concepts and simulation tools to explore 
the  space  of  possible  universes  (the  “cosmic  landscape"  as  Leonard  Susskin 
(2006) calls it in the framework of string theory). In (Vidal 2008), I proposed to 
call this new field of research “Artificial Cosmogenesis”. It is an attempt to a 
“general cosmology”, in analogy with  Artificial Life which appeared with the 
help of computer simulations to enquiry about a “general biology”. 
In  summary,  if  we  assume  that  initial  conditions  are  analogous  to 
incompressible information, then there are two possible reactions. Either we claim 
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that we reached the limit of scientific understanding; or we recognize that we need 
an extended framework. Multiverse and computer simulations of other possible 
universes are examples of such extended frameworks. 
Let us now see some limits of this computational analogy. If we apply our 
careful  analogical  reasoning,  we  can  ask  “what  is  disanalogous  between  the 
functioning of our universe and that of a computer?”. We can at least make the 
following restrictions. In a computational paradigm, space and time are assumed 
to be independent, and non-relativistic.  Most of the well studied cellular automata 
even  use  only  two  spatial  dimensions,  which  is  of  course  a  limitation  for 
complexity to develop. 
A  fundamental  difference  between  a  physical  and  an  informational-
computational paradigm is that the former has at its core conservation laws such 
as  the  conservation  of  energy,  where  the  total  amount  of  energy  remains 
unchanged in  the  various  transformations  of  the  system.  By contrast,  the  bits 
manipulated by computers are not subjected to such conservation laws. We neither 
create  nor  destroy  energy,  whereas  we  easily  create  and  delete  files  in  our 
computers.  This  difference  can  be  summarized  by  the  adage:  “When  sharing 
energy, we divide it. When sharing information, we multiply it.”  (formula that I 
borrow from Pierre-Alain Cotnoir). 
Another  limit  of  this  computational  paradigm  (which  is  similar  to  a 
Newtonian worldview) is that when we have initial conditions, and a set of rules 
or laws, then the evolution of the system is trivial and predictable: it is just an 
application of rules/laws to the initial conditions. There would not be much more 
to understand, as such a model would capture the whole of reality. 
The complexity of interactions (such as synergies, feed-back loops, chaos, 
random errors, etc.) is not in the focus of this approach.  The biological analogy is 
more  appropriate  in  giving  insights  into  the  complexity  of  interactions. 
Embryologists know that the formation of a fetus is a process of an incredible and 
fascinating  complexity,  leading  from  one  single  cell,  to  the  complexity  of  a 
billions-cells organism. The development of the individual is certainly not as easy 
to  predict  from  the  genome  to  the  phenotype  as  was  the  case  with  the 
computational paradigm: we just needed the initial conditions and a set of rules to 
understand  the  dynamic.  By  contrast,  in  biology,  phenomena  of  phenotypic 
plasticity have been identified, i.e. the acknowledgement that phenotypes are not 
uniquely  determined  by  their  genotype.  This  becomes  particularly  clear  when 
considering genetically identical twins. They exhibit many identical features, but 
also a unique differentiation, due to more stochastic processes occurring during 
the development.  As Martin Rees (2000, 21) noticed, cosmology deals with the 
inanimate  world,  which  is  in  fact  simpler  than  the  realm  of  biology.  A 
phenomenon is difficult to understand because it is complex, not because it has a 
huge extension.  
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4 The biological universe
The idea that our universe is similar to an organism has a long story, which 
is still very inspiring. It can be traced back to the Ancient Greece (see Barrow and 
Tipler 1986 for historical aspects). One general aim of the “Evo Devo Universe” 
research community is to explore how traditional cosmology can be enriched by 
introducing a biological paradigm, as suggested by George Ellis  (2007b, Thesis 
H4).  More  specifically,  the  field  of  evolutionary  developmental  ("evo-devo") 
biology (e.g. Carroll 2005) provides a great source of inspiration, acknowledging 
both the contingency of evolutionary processes and the statistically predictable 
aspect of developmental processes. We will now focus our attention on what is 
analogous in biological systems regarding initial conditions. 
Lee  Smolin's  Cosmological  Natural  Selection  (CNS)  hypothesis  is  an 
example of a biologically-inspired approach to the fine-tuning problem (Smolin 
1992; 1997; 2007). One can introduce his theory with an (other!) analogy.  The 
situation in contemporary cosmology is analogous to the one in biology before the 
theory of evolution, when one of the core questions was “(1) Why are the different  
species as they are?”. It was assumed more or less implicitly that “(2) Species are 
timeless  categories”.  In  present  physics,  the  question  behind  the  fine-tuning 
problem is “(1') Why are the physical constants as they are?”.  Currently, it  is 
usually assumed (probably from the remains of the Newtonian worldview) that 
“(2')  Physical  constants  are  timeless”.  It  is  by  breaking  assumption  (2)  that 
Darwin was able to theorize about the origin of species. Analogously, Smolin is 
trying  to  break  assumption  (2'),  by theorizing  about  the  origin  of  constants.  
According to this natural selection of universes theory, black holes give 
birth to new universes by producing the equivalent of a big-bang, which produces 
a baby universe with slightly different constants. This introduces variation, while 
the differential success in self-reproduction  of universes (via their black holes) 
provides the equivalent of natural selection. This leads to a Darwinian evolution 
of  universes,  whose  constants  are  fine-tuned  for  black  hole  generation,  a 
prediction that can in principle be verified.
One might be surprised by the speculative aspect of this theory. Although 
Smolin  emphasizes  the  refutability  of  CNS  and  thus  its  scientific  aspect  in 
(Smolin  2007),  he  himself  is  not  proud  that  the  theory  talks  about  processes 
outside the universe (Smolin 1997, 114). This conjectural aspect of the theory puts 
it at the edge of science and philosophy (Vaas 1998). Let us stress once again that 
when we attempt to answer the metaphysical question  “why is the universe the 
way it is?”, we must be ready to cross the border of current experimental and 
observational science. Attempting to answer this issue leads to the construction of 
speculative  theories.  The  nature  of  the  inquiry  then  becomes  philosophical, 
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because  we  aim  at  answering  our  most  profound  questions  here  and  now, 
whatever their difficulty and our limited knowledge (Vidal 2007). 
This non-scientific (but not un-scientific) aspect would at first sight be a 
reason to fall into an intellectual relativism, where every theory would have equal 
value,  since  anyway,  there  seems  to  be  no  way  to scientifically  compare 
competing  speculations.  This  is  correct,  but  it  is  still  possible  to  compare 
speculations from a philosophical standpoint.  I proposed a general philosophical 
framework and criteria to compare philosophical speculations (Vidal 2007; 2009). 
In  the  following  pages,  we  will  intentionally  address  the  problem  from  this 
speculative philosophical point of view, focusing our attention on the  objective 
criteria we  have  identified  for  a  good  philosophical  system.  A philosophical 
system is better than an other, when, other things being equal:
(1) It has a better fit with all the natural sciences.
(2) It addresses and adequately resolves a broader range of philosophical 
questions.
(3) It exhibits greater internal and systemic coherence. It thus has fewer 
anomalies.
From this point of view, CNS has some limitations. Firstly, the roles of life 
and  intelligence  are  incidental.  Criterium (2)  is  then  poorly  satisfied  because, 
without  including  life  in  the  cosmic  picture,  this  theory  diminishes  its 
philosophical scope and depth considerably. Indeed, the philosophical endeavour 
is mainly concerned with the relation between humanity and intelligence on the 
one  hand  and  the  universe  on  the  other  hand.  Secondly,  the  theory  does  not 
propose a hereditary mechanism for universe replication  (Gardner 2003, 84). Its 
internal coherence is thus imperfect and could be improved regarding criteria (3). 
As Gentner and Jeziorski proposed in the third principle of analogical reasoning 
(see the second section), one should seek for the greatest possible systematicity in 
the relational network. Is it possible to overcome these two shortcomings? 
A few authors have dared to extend CNS by including intelligent life into 
the picture (Crane 2009; Harrison 1995; Gardner 2000; 2003; Baláz 2005; Smart 
2008; Vidal 2008; Stewart 2009). They put forward the hypothesis that life and 
intelligence could perform this mechanism of heredity, thus playing an essential 
role in the Darwinian evolution of universes. To better  grasp this extension of 
CNS,  Baláz  and  Gardner  proposed  to  consider  von  Neumann's  (1951) four 
components of a self-reproducing automaton. We summarized this completion of 
CNS in table 1. below. 
Let us describe these four components in more detail. Physical constants 
are analogous to DNA in biology, and to the  blueprint  of  this self-reproducing 
automaton.  The universe at  large or the cell  as a whole constitute the  factory. 
When  furnished  with  the  description  of  another  automaton  in  the  form  of  a 
blueprint,  the  factory will  construct  this  automaton.  The  reproducer reads  the 
blueprint  and  produces  a  second blueprint.  In  the  cell,  these  are  reproduction 
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mechanisms of the DNA. The controller will cause the reproducer to make a new 
blueprint, and cause the factory to produce the automaton described by the new 
blueprint.  The  controller  separates  the  new construction  from the  factory,  the 
reproducer  and the  controller.  If  this  new construction  is  given  a  blueprint,  it 
finally forms a new independent self-reproducing automaton.
Components Description BIOLOGY(cell)
COSMOLOGY
(universe)
Blueprint Gives instructions for the construction of the automaton
Information contained 
in the DNA Physical constants
Factory Carries out the construction Cell The universe at large
Reproducer Reads the blueprint and produces a second blueprint
The reproduction of 
the DNA
CNS:?
Intelligence unravelling 
the universe's blueprint
Controller Ensures the factory follows the blueprint
The regulatory 
mechanisms of the 
mitosis
CNS:?
A cosmic process, 
aiming at universe 
reproduction
Table 1. Components of a von Neumann’s (1951) self-reproducing automaton. The 
second column  provides a general description of the automaton functions. The third 
and fourth columns propose examples respectively in biology - the cell  - and in 
cosmology - the universe.  
We now clearly see the limits of the CNS model, which is not specifying 
what  the  reproducer  and  controller  are.  Intelligence  unravelling  the  universe's 
blueprint  can  precisely  fulfil  the  reproducer's  function.  This  reproducer 
component is indeed essential for providing a mechanism for heredity. Without 
heredity,  there  can  be  no  Darwinian  evolution.  The  controller  in  this  context 
would be a more general process, aiming at universe reproduction with the help of 
intelligence. In Table 1, we completed in bold these two missing components of 
CNS,  thus  including  intelligence  in  this  hypothesized  cosmic  reproduction 
process.  
Let  us  now  explore  in  more  depth  the  biological  analogy  of  natural 
selection  and  apply  it  to  cosmological  evolution.  Natural  selection  implies  a 
differential  reproduction  with  a  high  level  of  fidelity,  still  permitting  some 
mutations. Is there a fidelity in reproduction of physical constants in CNS? If the 
fidelity were perfect, there would be no evolution, and thus no dynamic to fine 
tune the constants. If the fidelity were not perfect, it would imply that there are 
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slight changes in the constants from one universe to another. Yet the whole point 
of fine-tuning arguments is to show that small changes in physical parameters do 
not  lead  to  a  viable  universe!  It  thus  seems very unlikely that  a  CNS would 
succeed in producing a fine-tuned universe. 
A consequence of this speculative theory is that intelligent life, unravelling 
the universe through scientific understanding, generates a “cosmic blueprint” (a 
term used by Paul Davies  (1989)). The cosmic blueprint can be seen as the set of 
physical  constants;  or  just  initial  conditions  of  a  cosmological  model,  if  our 
previous reasoning holds. One can now throw a new light on the fact that cosmic 
evolution gave rise to scientific activity. In this view, the increasing modelling 
abilities of intelligent beings is not an accident, but an indispensable feature of our 
universe, to produce a new offspring universe. 
I have argued that fine-tuning of this cosmic blueprint would take place in 
“virtual universes”, that is in simulated universes  (Vidal 2008). This scenario is 
likely  if  we  seriously  consider  and  extrapolate  the  exponential  increase  of 
computer  resources.  As  argued  earlier,  simulating  universes  would  also  allow 
virtual experimentation, and thus to compare our own universe with other possible 
ones.  This endeavour would therefore help to progress concretely on the fine-
tuning issue.
One can interpret this approach as a variation on the multiverse proposal. 
However,  the  selection  of  universes  would  take  place  on  simulated  universes, 
replacing  Smolin's  natural  selection  of  real  universes (Barrow 2001,  151).  In 
CNS, we need many generations of universes in order to randomly generate an 
interesting fine-tuned universe. In contrast,  these simulations would dramatically 
improve  the  process  by  artificially  selecting  (via  simulations)  which  universe 
would exhibit the desired features for the next generation universe. This would 
facilitate the daunting task of producing a new universe. In this case it would be 
appropriate to speak about a “Cosmological Artificial Selection” (CAS), instead of 
a “Cosmological Natural Selection”. 
One question which naturally arises when considering this CAS, is “why 
would intelligent life want to produce a new offspring universe?”. This is an issue 
which  would  deserve  much  more  development,  but  we  briefly  propose  the 
following answer (see also  (Harrison 1995; Vidal 2008)). The core problem an 
intelligent  civilization  has  to  deal  with in  the  very far  future  is  the  inevitable 
thermodynamical  decay  of  stars,  solar  systems,  galaxies  and  finally  of  the 
universe itself. This scenario is commonly known as the heat death (e.g. Adams 
and  Laughlin  1997;  Ćirković  2003  for  a  review).  Surprisingly  there  is  little 
interest in this fundamental and inevitable ageing of the universe. In the realm of 
biology, the solution to the problem of aging is reproduction. Could it be that an 
analogous solution would take place at the scale of the universe? Pursuing this 
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cosmic replication process would in principle enable the avoidance of heat death 
in a particular universe  (Vidal 2008). Cosmic evolution would then continue its 
course indefinitely. 
This  approach  may  sound  like  science-fiction.  It  is  however  no  more 
extravagant  than  the  competing  explanations,  which  are  the  belief  in  a 
supernatural  God, or the ontological statement  that  there actually exist  a  huge 
number or an infinity of other universes. To summarize, the perspective of a CAS:
1. Proposes a response to the heat death problem.
2. Enables  us  to  scientifically  progress  on  the  fine-tuning  problem,  via 
universe simulations. This remains acceptable even if one does not wish to 
endorse the complete speculative framework proposed, i.e. with intelligent 
life involved in universe reproduction.
3. Offers intelligent life a fundamental role in cosmic evolution.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis  of  physical  parameters  led  us  to  the conclusion that  fine-
tuning of physical constants would progressively be reduced to the fine-tuning of 
initial conditions in a cosmological model. However, it is unlikely that a physical 
theory would derive  all cosmological initial conditions. Multiverse and universe 
simulations are two similar options to go beyond this limitation, because they both 
propose ways to vary those initial conditions. 
The computational analogy suggests a description of the universe in terms 
of information and computation. Simulations have already started to be used to 
tackle the fine-tuning problem, allowing us to vary  several physical parameters, 
and exploring the resulting possible universes. 
We outlined a philosophical extension of Smolin's “Cosmological Natural 
Selection” theory, inspired by a biological analogy. It led us to the hypothesis that 
intelligent life is currently unravelling a cosmic blueprint, which could be used in 
the far future to produce a new offspring universe. Simulating an entire universe 
would be an efficient way to fine tune this cosmic blueprint. Furthermore, this 
offspring universe would perpetuate cosmic evolution beyond the predictable heat 
death of our universe. 
Physical, computational and biological descriptions are different ways to 
model  the  universe.  Providing  that  we make clear  and  explicit  our  analogical 
reasoning, keeping this diversity of possible modelling approaches is certainly a 
way to constantly enrich and cross-fertilize our models. Importantly, we have to 
acknowledge  the  limits  of  scientific  enquiry  when  tackling  the  fine-tuning 
problem.  A philosophical  approach  allows  us  to  keep  a  rational  and  critical 
attitude. 
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